A Cornerstone of the Regional Political Order

The US-Israeli war on Iran has put Egypt in a predicament. Since the 2013 coup that brought him to power, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi has enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with Gulf leaders who welcomed his crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood after the 2011 Arab Spring protests. Sisi has been a cornerstone of the new regional political order that connects Egypt to the United States and the Gulf states. Cairo is also heavily indebted to many of the Gulf states that Iran has targeted in its response to the 2026 war. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have poured tens of billions of dollars in grants, central bank deposits, and investments to help Egypt weather serious economic troubles over the years. Yet skeptics in the Gulf are asking whether Cairo really has the GCC’s interests at heart, given Egypt’s failure to provide military support in their ongoing confrontation with Iran.

The Mediator

Egypt was quick to condemn Tehran’s missile and drone strikes on the Gulf states. Sisi called Iran’s actions criminal during his visits to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While formally asserting its neutrality in the conflict, Cairo -along with Pakistan and Turkey- helped devise a diplomatic path that led to the two-week US-Iran ceasefire that effectively ended Iranian attacks on the GCC. On April 18, 2026, Sisi’s foreign minister, Badr Abdelatty, announced that Egypt was working with Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to reach a broad security deal that would end the conflict altogether.

Criticism and Rebuttals

Nevertheless, Gulf intellectuals and social media influencers criticized Egypt’s reticence to act more directly in support of the GCC. Often using unflattering language about the country, they reminded Egyptians of the Gulf’s open checkbooks offered since Sisi came to power.  Egyptian journalists and media commentators responded to these criticisms with vitriol, prompting state media bodies to warn that such verbal attacks on “fellow Arab states” are criminalized in Egypt. Given the controlled media space in both Egypt and the Gulf, the negative comments must be considered reflections of positions that, for diplomatic reasons, Cairo and some Gulf capitals cannot voice publicly.

Since at least the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Washington has been the primary security guarantor in the region. Although several GCC states have hosted US military bases for decades, Gulf leaders have never been able to make that military partnership ironclad. Gulf leaders have been able to secure from Washington a steady supply of modern weaponry, costing them billions of dollars annually. But with the notable exception of President Donald Trump’s September 2025 executive order on Qatar, the United States has not provided them with mutual defense agreements or defense guarantees.

US National Interests

US military assets in the Gulf primarily serve to project its influence in a strategic region in line with the US’s long-term national interests. US military assets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, were not, in those countries’ views, rapidly enough deployed to protect the Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil facilities following the Iranian-attributed 2019 attack or to Abu Dhabi after a similar 2022 strike. The recent conflagration with Iran suggests that US military assets in Gulf Arab countries are strictly intended to defend US bases there, not the host countries.

The Domestic Economy

Egypt’s leadership seems to combine economic caution with political anxiety when it comes to making decisions over whether to send military support to the Gulf. Egypt suffers from high inflation (above 15 percent in March 2026) and lower economic growth in 2026 (4.2 percent). In part, these parameters were caused by a substantial decline in Suez Canal revenue, a high debt-to-GDP ratio (around 83 percent), and an ever declining value of the national currency. Involving the armed forces in external affairs is a luxury that the Egyptian economy cannot seem to afford.

Egypt’s Concerns about its Backyard

Sisi and his lieutenants are also worried about Egypt’s immediate neighborhood. First, although Gaza has been temporarily displaced from television screens by the US-Israel war on Iran, Israel’s war on the Strip continues, raising the specter for Palestinian refugees fleeing into Egypt.. Second, Sudan’s civil war is in its fourth year and might spill over into Egypt as the stalemate between the warring parties risks the de facto partition of Africa’s third-largest country. Similarly, Egypt cannot ignore the divisions in neighboring Libya, where Cairo over the years played a pivotal role. Egypt also remains on the lookout for what might happen with its ongoing and dangerous dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile waters, a dispute Egyptians consider a grave threat to their national security. Lastly, Egypt faces serious concerns along the Red Sea littoral and the Gulf of Aden, including Yemen’s Houthis, the security of the Bab al-Mandab waterway, and Somaliland’s secession. These uncertainties in Egypt’s strategic neighborhood mean that its leadership may be wary of unwarranted engagement in defending GCC states against Iranian attacks.

No Guns for Hire and no free Lunch

Today’s tensions between Egypt and the Gulf states have arisen from the combination of high expectations in the Gulf and expediency from Egypt’s leaders. GCC residents might have thought that Egypt’s armed forces could be used as guns for hire, to repay earlier financial assistance. Conversely, Egyptian decision-makers perhaps believed that Gulf money was given freely, with no strings attached. Both perspectives have failed the tests of time and circumstance. Whether a course correction may be required in the relations between Egypt and the Gulf states is anyone’s guess.