The Fight for Nationwide Dominance

On April 15, 2023, a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti,” erupted into what has become a devastating war and humanitarian crisis. By 2025, Sudan had two rival governments – one formed by the SAF and the other by the RSF- against the backdrop of failed international mediation efforts. The fighting continues to this day.

The Fight for Democracy

Sudan’s war can be traced back to the 2018–2019 popular uprising that toppled Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year Islamist military rule. At its core, the people of Sudan demanded full civilian rule and the armed forces’ full withdrawal from politics and the economy. By April 2019, popular pressure forced the military to remove al-Bashir and his party. Yet, to preserve a military-run state, senior SAF officers formed the Transitional Military Council (TMC), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The Council included the RSF, which had grown out of the Janjaweed militias. In August 2019, the TMC and the civilian leadership, signed a power-sharing agreement that created  the so-called sovereignty council to lead the post-Bashir transition The real power, however, was kept with the TMC. In October 2021, a coup by the SAF and the RSF -at the time still allies- ousted the civilian leadership. It derailed Sudan’s chance for a path toward democratic rule.

Post-Coup Tensions

After the coup, tensions emerged between the SAF and the RSF, in particular over control of Sudan’s gold sector. The United Arab Emirates is an important player in this context, being the primary destination for militia gold smuggling, which is then channeled into global markets. In exchange for gold and political loyalty, the UAE supplies the RSF with weapons. In 2023, conflict between the heads of the SAF and RSF broke out over the question of integrating the RSF into Sudan’s national armed forces, as both Burhan and Hemedti sought to preserve their power. The current war is therefore best understood as a war between counterrevolutionary factions that are backed by internal and external actors whose interests make them determined to preserve Sudan’s military state.

The Fall of the Capital and its Ramifications

For the RSF, the March 2025 loss of Khartoum, which it had seized at the start of the war, was devastating to its political influence and military position. Since then, however, the RSF managed to consolidate its grip on most of the Darfur and Kordofan regions, and in August 2025 it formed the Government of Peace and Unity. RSF Commander Hemedti was sworn in as head of its presidential council, with RSF members, allied armed groups and other parties making up the rest of the self-styled government. In establishing this soon after losing Khartoum, the RSF sought to challenge the SAF’s claim to legitimacy, a move that deepened Sudan’s fragmentation.

A War on Civilians

Sudan’s civilians have been subjected to relentless atrocities and a worsening humanitarian crisis. Sudan is currently home to the world’s largest displacement crisis, with almost 12million people forcibly displaced, according to the UNHCR. On September 5, 2025, the UN Human Rights Council’s Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan reported that “both parties to the conflict violated international human rights and humanitarian law, with most violations amounting to war crimes.” The report documented mass killings, forced displacement, looting, and the destruction of hospitals, displacement camps, and educational institutions. Women and girls are subjected to systematic sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and other abuses.

Going Hungry

The escalation of violence has also intensified Sudan’s hunger crisis. The country now ranks among the top four nations globally for acute malnutrition, with more than half its population suffering from severe hunger. As in Gaza, the war has enabled armed groups to exploit food insecurity. Both factions have targeted Sudan’s most fertile regions, disrupting agricultural production, displacing local populations, and cutting off communities from the food sources they depend on. Starvation is not just a byproduct of war but a weapon used to weaken and ethnically cleanse vulnerable communities and to consolidate territorial control.

Trapped in Al-Fasher

Restrictions on movement and access to aid are acute. The SAF has delayed or denied travel permits for aid agencies, making it nearly impossible to reach RSF-controlled areas. In April 2024, the RSF began a siege on al-Fasher and prevented food and lifesaving assistance from entering. They also made it nearly impossible for civilians to escape. Al-Fasher once had 36 clinics and hospitals. As of September 2025, only one remained partially functional.. Families say they have been reduced to eating leaves and animal feed.

The Collapse of International Humanitarian Aid

The situation in Sudan has become more dire as international aid has sharply declined. The United States had been Sudan’s largest humanitarian donor, providing nearly 44 percent of all humanitarian funding in 2024. However, President Trump began slashing foreign aid soon after assuming office, including for Sudan. France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK have likewise scaled back their assistance.

With international support collapsing, Sudanese civilians have been left to fend for themselves, relying on local resistance committees and grassroots mutual aid networks to respond to urgent needs. These committees – who represent Sudan’s leading pro-democracy movement – played a key role in the 2019 revolution and later mobilized against the 2021 coup They are influential actors through their community-based activism. When war erupted in 2023, they shifted toward humanitarian efforts, creating Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), which are informal, youth-led networks that deliver lifesaving assistance in areas that international agencies cannot reach. ERRs have provided food, water, emergency medical care, and education.

Failed Mediation Efforts and Sanctions

International mediation has attempted and failed to resolve the conflict. July 2025 talks between the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE (referred to as “the Quad”) were canceled by the US due to disagreements over a final joint statement and over what roles the SAF and RSF would play in Sudan’s post-war political order. Egypt has been closely aligned with the SAF and opposed a portion of the proposed statement, declaring that neither the SAF nor the RSF should lead the postwar transitional government. Egypt supports the SAF’s al-Burhan because Cairo is concerned about instability along its southern border and the future of the Nile River basin. Meanwhile, Hemedti maintains close ties with Ethiopia and the UAE. While the UAE is one of Egypt’s most important benefactors, it is also a competitor for influence in the region.. Despite these differences, on September 12, 2025, the Quad announced that they had agreed to a joint roadmap to end the war in Sudan. However, only six days later  SAF chief al-Burhan rejected the roadmap and insisted that peace could not be achieved without a military solution. The RSF likewise resisted ceasefire efforts, convinced that it was on the verge of victory in al-Fasher. About a month after the Quad proposal, the RSF indeed captured the city, and now effectively controls all of Darfur.

A Lack of Pressure

Mediation so far has lacked a strong actor capable and willing of exerting pressure on the warring parties and their foreign backers, most notably the UAE. The Quad’s roadmap continued this pattern, building on the Jeddah ceasefire talks, the Geneva peace talks, and sanctions against both the SAF and RSF. All of these efforts failed to produce meaningful progress. Peace initiatives have focused on short-term ceasefires rather than addressing the root causes of the conflict. They have also excluded Resistance Committees and other civilian actors from the peace process.