Release peace: the magazine

Release peace: the magazine

Analysis & Background Stories on International Affairs

Observations on How Syria’s Islamist Rulers Are Building a State

This article was published as part of a collaboration with the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). It is based on this PRIF blog article. The piece is based on interviews conducted in May and December 2025 in Syria by Regine Schwab and Samer Massoud, with further contributions to the article by Ammar Hassan.

Gradualism Thus Far

In contrast to the Taliban and other revolutionary organisations that aim to deeply transform society and the state, the Syrian experience thus far has been characterised by gradualism in institution building and bureaucratic reform. The transitional government, led by the now-president and former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) commander al-Sharaa, is in control of most parts of the country, excluding a few Kurdish-majority cities in the north and parts of the Suwayda Governorate in the south.

Wartime Foundations

The former rebels now ruling the country have gained significant experience in governance, starting in March 2015 with the so-called Executive Administration, affiliated with the rebel coalition Jaysh al-Fath (Army of Conquest) that ruled over large parts of Idlib. This administration, which was staffed by members of rebel groups or civilians affiliated with them, acted more as a quota system to distribute power and positions among the participating groups rather than a functioning government. This failed experience led to increasing pressure to establish a government that was, at least nominally, independent of these groups. In 2017, this took shape in the foundation of the Salvation Government, a nominally technocratic administration initially run by academics. However, the financial sector remained under HTS control. Initially, the current government was a continuation of the Salvation Government, but is now increasingly merging with other administrative systems.

One Country, Four Systems

The challenge facing Syria’s new rulers is unprecedented in its complexity. The new authorities are building a state by integrating four previous administrative systems: the HTS-backed Salvation Government in northwest Syria, the Turkish-backed administration in the north, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the deficient bureaucracy of Assad’s regime.

Beyond their differing ideologies, these systems had different bureaucratic logics and legal frameworks, which makes their integration highly challenging. The ongoing problem of differing pay scales in the Aleppo Governorate, which has experienced all four governance systems, embodies this most clearly. According to on-the-ground interviews conducted by this article’s authors, teachers in formerly regime-held Aleppo city earn the least, followed by those from Turkish-backed areas, with former Salvation Government areas in western Aleppo earning the most.

Continuity and Selective Renewal

The new Syrian authorities have decided not to dissolve state institutions and to retain most personnel. According to individuals the authors of this article spoke with, members of the new administration have studied the Iraqi experience, where the US decision to dissolve state institutions in 2003 led to chaos and civil war. Choosing gradualism has enabled the continuation of life after the rebels took Damascus. Apart from exceptional laws and courts, such as the notorious terrorism court, most laws, institutions, and personnel have been kept in place.

A Layered Approach

HTS’ otherwise gradual approach follows a clear pattern: In most institutions, the top layer has been entirely replaced with HTS members or rebel allies, such as members of Ahrar al-Sham, while street-level bureaucrats have largely been retained. For example, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HTS cadres occupy most leading positions, but 70% of lower-level personnel are holdovers from the previous regime.

Justice Under Construction

Nowhere is gradualism more evident than in the judicial sector. According to Ibrahim, a senior official of the High Institute of the Judiciary, approximately 200 judges – about 10% of the total – have been dismissed for corruption, involvement in killings, or “moral issues.” Currently, judges’ rankings are being reevaluated based on their achievements and academic research. “Before, children of judges were nominated routinely as judges just because they were their offspring,” the official noted, describing a system built on wasta (‘connections’) and seniority, rather than merit.

Judicial Reorganisation

According to Ibrahim, Syria needs at present at least 3,000 judges. Given the dismissals and ongoing re-evaluations, there is pressure to integrate former judges from opposition-held territories, even those with only Islamic law credentials. Before resuming their positions, however, these judges are to be retrained in Syrian law. Regular meetings bring together judges and lawyers from different systems – Turkish-supported areas that used Syrian law and Idlib that used Sharia law – to integrate these different structures and mentalities. An Alawite lawyer the authors of this article spoke to in Damascus offered a positive assessment of the judicial reforms: “The procedures are better now – I as a lawyer can work with them.”

The Price of Continuity

The decision to leave most institutions, laws, and even personnel in place has created its own absurdities. Assad-era laws remain in force, including fines for internally displaced persons who fail to register their documents with the respective authorities. The ministries that were rebuild completely, like the Ministries of Defence and Interior, have advanced most quickly in their work. In contrast, the Ministry of Local Administration – one of the institutions experiencing the most continuity – faces immense challenges. Long hierarchical chains delay decision-making, prompting some officials to bypass formal channels and take legal risks to get things done faster.

A Bloated Bureaucracy

Syria’s ministries together employ roughly one million people. “Many employees have no clear role, yet cannot simply be dismissed,” Diaa Aldeen, an official at the Ministry of Administrative Development noted. Employees of the former regime are paid meagre wages under Law No. 50, but “they lack experience and dynamism in their work.” Still, Aldeen noted that those “who develop themselves and strive will be rewarded.” Syria’s labour law has not been updated yet, which has limited directors’ ability to hire qualified staff on permanent terms. Instead, they have to rely on temporary contracts. This replicates different wage schemes in the ministries, where those who were employees under the former regime receive the lowest wages, followed by former employees of the Salvation Government. Employees with the new temporary contracts earn the most. It is a setup that leads to confusion and grievances among personnel. But as Aldeen notes, “the pay gap is significant, yes, but that’s to be expected, and there’s nothing we can do about it at the moment because the vast majority of staff are still from the previous regime, and their salaries are being increased gradually.”

Convergence or Divergence?

Syria is witnessing neither revolutionary transformation nor shock therapy in its administrative institutions, but rather a slow, improvisational merger of fundamentally different systems. A pattern emerges when examining different sectors: gradualism characterises civil administration, while security and military domains have seen radical breaks.

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