Context of Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste

Previously a Portuguese colony, Timor-Leste came under Indonesian control in 1975, leading to a regime marked by frequent and severe human rights violations. Sexual violence, deprivation of resources, and assassinations were frequently inflicted on the local population as punishment for dissent. In 1999, an independence referendum under UN auspices saw 78.5% voting in favour of independence, with a turnout of 98%. The result was followed by a surge of pro-Indonesian militia violence centred on the capital, Dili, which prompted mass evacuations. Following the UN-led transitional period, an independent Timorese state was formally established on 20 May 2002. These circumstances made Timor-Leste a prominent test-case for peacebuilding and nation-building practices.

Timeline of United Nations Involvement

The nature of UN involvement in Timor-Leste underwent considerable changes over the period between 1999 and 2006. Following the conclusion of initial peacekeeping work (INTERFET 1999-2000), a transitional administration (UNTAET 1999-2002) was instituted. The UN held full executive authority over the government between 25 October 1999 and 20 May 2002. Numerous support missions (including UNMISET 2002-2005 and UNOTIL 2005-2006) were launched to build institutional capacity. The missions strengthened law enforcement and the justice system, establishing institutional priorities which included the delivery of justice and respect for human rights.  UNMIT (2006-2012) was established in August 2006, following a political and security crisis between April and June, and supported stabilisation efforts thereafter. These projects corresponded to phases of involvement: initial institution of executive governance, capacity-building, and reactive stabilisation.

The East-West Legacy

Despite the UN’s deep embeddedness in Timor-Leste, institutional legitimacy remains uneven and demographic divides endure. Historically, the “lorosa’e”, the people on the eastern side of the island of Timor (Timor-Leste being Portuguese for East Timor), had most effectively resisted Indonesia, whereas those in the west, the “loromonu”, were often perceived as more compliant. This regional distinction became critical following independence, when power and legitimacy were split between eastern and western factions. The divide between these groups has since developed an identitarian and socioeconomic significance. Though eastern networks had become local authorities, the UN treated the National Council of Timorese Resistance as a faction rather than a development partner. East-west and rural-urban divides deepened during the post-conflict period, and later surfaced in episodes of urban violence, especially during the 2006 crisis.

A Focus on the Capital

The capital of Timor-Leste, Dili, was already the principal administrative and economic centre in the territory before the end of Indonesian occupation. During the UN missions, most international support focused on Dili, which helped concentrate power with the urban elite. While wealth and infrastructural spending increased, poverty and resource insecurity persisted in the rural areas, as reconstruction priorities remained capital-focused. The crisis of 2006 was an intense civil conflict centred on Dili, associated with issues around national identity and the experience of lost recognition among easterners. The East-West issue was brought into focus when disaffected defence force soldiers accused superiors of misconduct and discrimination. Young people representing east and west each participated in the unrest as it escalated. Violent confrontations occurred between crowds and security personnel, leading to numerous armed clashes between loyalist and dissident groups.

Limitations of Liberal Democratic Imposition

UNTAET was largely concerned with the immediate institution of democratic elections in Timor-Leste.  This priority was pursued despite an absence of strong and legitimate local institutions to support an electoral democracy. The democracy-first approach was based on liberal notions of peacebuilding, prioritising the establishment of a nation-state. The administration struggled with actors like the National Resistance Council for legitimacy. It contributed to a split between traditional and liberal sources of authority, which exacerbated discontent with the new system.

The 2001 Elections

Fretilin, a political party succeeding the resistance, took 55 out of 88 parliamentary seats after the 2001 ballot. This consolidated its institutional position and shaped later political contests. Numerous post-liberal critics associate the country’s ongoing divides and dysfunction with imported Western ideals and institutional approaches. According to this criticism, necessary functions like identity-building, reconciliation, and capacity-building were neglected. The limited attention given to these functions contributed to regional division and to the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2006 crisis.

The Significance of Local Leadership

The UN’s involvement in Timor-Leste represented an application of Western liberal processes for peacebuilding rather than an Indigenous-led programme. Local traditions like “lulik” (taboo) and the custom of “nahe-biti bo’ot” (reconciliation discussion including rituals) were not integrated within the formal peace process. This cost key opportunities for reconciliation and dispute resolution. An analysis by Minji Yoo found that local leaders were crucial in supporting the peace process. The Catholic Church gained legitimacy among locals through its assistance during occupation, and also led reconciliation efforts afterward. The failure of the state to respect local leadership meant that it would be more difficult to develop shared legitimacy.

The Example of the CAVR

The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, a body drawing on local involvement, succeeded widely in resolving grievances. The CAVR’s “Community Reconciliation Process” utilised community-centric methods of conflict resolution and was completed in over 1400 cases nationwide. The CAVR‘s activities are believed to have prevented retaliatory violence in the period after 1999. A report by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement suggests that the CAVR was a necessary supporter to the UN missions. Despite many requests, community-based reconciliation was not pursued further by the state, which was a limitation of the peace process.

The Liberal Peacebuilding Approach

The UN’s approach in Timor-Leste reflects a conservative application of liberal peacebuilding, focused on building order and the institutions of government. Scholars like Oliver Richmond, Jason Franks, Joanne Wallis, or Dahlia Simangan have      criticised the “conservative-liberal” approach in Timor-Leste. The UN consistently prioritised the transplantation of Western-style democratic institutions to Timor-Leste. Social engineering, the establishment of Western-style democratic infrastructure, and economic reform were set out as the steps toward peace. This prioritisation emphasised results and efficiency over understanding and adaptation.

Alternatives to Liberal Peacebuilding

In the two decades since Timor-Leste has gained independence, the predominance of liberal peacebuilding was partially reduced Nation-building projects such as Somaliland, Bougainville, Colombia, and Rwanda have empowered local institutions and consulted with locals, with more context-sensitive results. Each case centred on participation, such as by building capacity for Indigenous communities and facilitating the customary expression of grievances. This raises the question of the efficacy of locally-led structural remediation, and how best to balance them with the needs and abilities of external actors such as the UN.