Addressing Taiwanese Identity

“Taiwan is our country, this beautiful island is our home, Chinese culture is our root, and democracy and freedom are our treasures” – these were the words of Han Kuo-yu on Taiwan’s 2024 National Day. He is the speaker of Taiwan’s Legislature and was the 2020 presidential candidate for the KMT (Kuomintang) party. This quote references a complex Taiwanese identity functioning at different levels: physical location, cultural roots, and societal and political norms.

The History of Taiwanese Identity, the KMT, and the DPP

This was not always the case with KMT politicians. Before Taiwan’s transition to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s the KMT, was the sole party in power and generally denied the existence of a Taiwanese culture or identity district from China. With democratization, however, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) was elected to office for the first time in the year 2000. It was founded around Taiwanese nationalism and formulated a distinct, non-Chinese Taiwanese identity. In more recent years, politicians of the KMT also speak to a distinct Taiwanese identity but tend to not embrace it as much as the DPP.

The Taiwanese Brand

As in all democratic countries, Taiwanese politicians will look to reflect the values of their voters when talking about national identity. DPP leaders in the Taiwanese government have pushed Taiwanese cultural identity into the spotlight, creating a “Taiwanese brand.” For example, DPP-led initiatives have funded local cultural industries and supported a tourism industry based around a uniquely Taiwanese culture. They also promoted a distinct labeling of Taiwanese products and passports as Taiwanese. The DPP has also triggered a change in how Taiwanese identity is addressed in schools and academia, centering history curricula around Taiwanese history, as well as increasing the sponsorship of Taiwanese Studies programs.

Han Elements of Taiwanese Identity

The KMT has long defined Taiwanese identity differently. The KMT has historically paid tribute to the Chinese and Han elements of Taiwanese culture and contrasted this with economics, politics, and geography to define a unique Taiwanese identity. The KMT has also utilized Taiwanese identity as a way to bring people together and create national unity. The term “community of shared fate” was coined in 1991 to define a Taiwanese identity based on the physical location of the island. This concept was supported by the former president and member of the KMT, Lee Tung-hui. It aimed to foster unity and diminish tensions between immigrants from mainland China and the island’s established residents. As part of this effort, the KMT-led government removed the designation of “second-generation mainlanders” from official records in 1992.

Connection Between Politics and Self-Identification

As the KMT and DPP define Taiwanese identity differently, scholars have looked for a correlation between the political affiliation of Taiwanese citizens and their self-identification. According to a survey analyzed by Rou-lan Chen, political party affiliation is the greatest measured marker of how Taiwanese citizens self-identify (i.e., as Chinese, Taiwanese, or both). Due to this, the electoral success of one party over another signals that that party’s understanding of Taiwanese identity is also dominant. In 2020 and 2024 the DPP has had success in both presidential and local elections, while the KMT has continued to lose support. This, as well as the very existence of a nationalist DPP, correlates with the rise of Taiwanese identity over Chinese identity. The KMT’s gradual change in position towards a stronger emphasis on Taiwanese identity also reflects voters’ beliefs.

Historical Factors

During Taiwan’s time under martial law prior to the democratization process mentioned earlier, the KMT tried to refute the existence of a distinct Taiwanese identity, instead claiming that Taiwan was culturally Chinese and only divided by politics. This led to policies like the banning of local languages in schools. This history of oppression and strict control over culture may also explain why the understanding of Taiwanese identity presented by the KMT is not as popular with Taiwanese citizens anymore and provided the electorate with an interest in the DPP as an alternative.

Trends in Self-Identification

Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century, surveys conducted by the Election Study Center show the prominence of a solely Taiwanese identity over Chinese and dual identities: In 2000, 12.5% and 44.1% of respondents identified with Chinese or dual identity, respectively. 37% identified solely with a Taiwanese identity. In 2020, however, only 2.4% and 27.5% of respondents identified with Chinese or dual identify, respectively, while 67% of respondents identified with a solely Taiwanese identity.

An Exception: 2016-2018

An exception to this trend occurred between 2016-2018, when the percentage of respondents claiming Taiwanese identity declined by 3.7% and those claiming dual identity increased by 3.9%. An explanation for this looks at how the popularity of elected officials influences how people self-identify. In 2016, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was elected president and the DPP won a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. Tsai’s administration implemented unpopular policies, leading to a decline in presidential approval ratings. According to scholars Wang et al., disapproval towards Tsai also likely was reflected onto the DPP as a whole. Further, Wang et al. argue that the DPP’s poor performance may have made citizens lose trust not only in the party’s policies but also in the values the DPP represents. Voters may have felt less sure about aligning themselves with something unpopular, leading to the decline in self-identification as Taiwanese in the Election Study Center survey. When the DPP’s popularity improved, however, such as after 2018, Taiwanese self-identification increased, and people identifying as Chinese or claiming a dual identity dropped. How politicians present Taiwanese identity can itself affect how Taiwanese citizens see their own national identity, both influencing and dissuading them.

Success of DPP and in Recent Election Cycles

Looking at how politicians define their national identity provides insight into how Taiwanese citizens self-identify and how this identity has changed. In 2024, DPP candidate Lai Ching-te won the presidential election. It was the third consecutive time the DPP carried the highest office while maintaining a nationalist definition of Taiwanese identity.