A Joke as a Coping Mechanism

Thirty years after the end of the war, a popular joke in Bosnia and Herzegovina compares the state to an onion: it has many layers and it is bound to make you cry. The metaphor captures a political reality: The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris, divided the republic into two ethnically defined entities. Those are the Bosniak- and Croat-dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS). The agreement created a complex system with power-sharing mechanisms and different layers of administration.

The Office of the High Representative

The ethnic categories of the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) form the basis of the country’s constitution.  As a result, it excludes those who do not identify as belonging to any of them. On top of this structure sits the Office of the High Representative (OHR). It was created to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. It is not elected by any of the citizens of the country but appointed by UN bodies. The OHR is the highest authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and is able to impose or veto legislation and to remove elected public officials from office.

From Socialist to Capitalist Elitism

The economic restructuring of BiH after the war must be understood in the larger post-1991 shift to capitalism, both globally and regionally. In socialist Yugoslavia, BiH had become one of the core industrial republics, with a development model based on state ownership and workers’ self-management. The political economy of the war following Yugoslavia’s dissolution was compelled to address the destruction of much of its industrial infrastructure and (forceful) displacement of its workforce. It did so through the seizure of social property by cadres of all conflict parties, who subsequently transformed it into state-owned property and companies. After the war, the privatization of state-owned industries was seen as imperative for postwar economic growth. In 1997, a voucher model overseen by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) enabled citizens to buy shares in state companies. However, this model was detached from the general process of peace implementation, outside the realm of the OSCE and the OHR, and designed “as a top-down project that left no room for public discussions or meaningful forms of accountability.”, according to research by Larisa Kurtović from the University of Ottawa. This benefited ethnonational cronies and political elites, who gained power by controlling many state-owned resources during and after the war. This contributed to the consolidation of economic power in the hands of those with connections to the political forces that emerged from the previous conflict parties. Privatization processes led to a new class structure in BiH, which comprises a small but wealthy elite.

The Deadlock of Identity Politics

Despite efforts to weaken the hold of identity politics, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political order remains captive to ethnonationalist parties. In part, because people continue voting for them. Why? First, because ethnopolitics is practiced in BiH through cultivating fear of other (ethnic) groups. This script is by no means exclusive to BiH, but integral to many nationalist and populist playbooks around the world. From a formerly unified language now presented as three languages (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian), over the controversial two schools under one roof system and (mostly) divided labor unions, to the tripartite presidency: the Dayton-designed administration has formalized the ethnonationalist principle by separating key institutions into three. Second, doctors, teachers, civil servants and public sector employees have been dependent on the support of the political structures in place and are politically vulnerable because authorities use threats of job loss and firing to quiet criticism and dissent. Additionally, political parties use social benefits received by war veterans, pensioners, and persons with disabilities to influence these voter blocks.

Brain Drain and Those Left Behind

An estimated one third or more of Bosnians now live outside BiH. While this number should be taken with a grain of salt since BiH has not conducted a census since 2013. What is known is that emigration is most prevalent among the young, working-age population and the skilled labor force. Young people’s lives in particular have been shaped by the postwar conditions and they often seek a better future abroad. The remaining population is rapidly aging, placing additional strain on BiH’s fragile health care and social security systems, which suffer severe understaffing and chronic underfunding. This has left the health care system among the weakest in Europe.

Dayton’s Legacy and Recent Decisions of the High Representative

International involvement has not resolved BiH’s structural contradictions. In many instances it has reproduced them. It remains especially the OHR that exercises powers commonly associated with states. This includes legislation and creating currency or passport systems. Between 2006 and 2014, the OHR’s role was diminished for the sake of the EU accession process. However, two recent uses of its power illustrate the OHR’s ambivalence. In July 2021, then-High Representative Valentin Inzko imposed amendments criminalizing the public denial or trivialization of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The step was justified as a response to continuing denial of the Srebrenica genocide in 1995, including by RS President Milorad Dodik. In 2023 the current High Representative Christian Schmidt reinterpreted aspects of contentious and unresolved property and land use law in ways that would have enabled the RS to grant temporary mining exploration concessions. N This included the highly sought-after resource lithium. Since the RS is chronically bankrupt, the same leadership that had been subject to Inzko’s ruling is now heavily courting foreign investors by offering access to RS-controlled natural resources. When the Bosnian constitutional court later declared the decision unlawful, Schmidt reported to the UN that this interpretation of the law could have negative effects on development and investment. It was a move that sidestepped local protests and environmental concerns.

Flawed Logic

Such interventions often send contradictory signals but have direct consequences for the lives of Bosnian citizens. Even under a benevolent interpretation, conferring final authority upon an unelected office is politically ambiguous. In its less benign form, that same concentration of power can mask external geopolitical and commercial interests. It gives preference to investment and geopolitical stability over social justice and democratic participation. The institutionalized reproduction of ethnonationalist logics within the post-Dayton order regenerates the very need for an OHR endowed with autonomous authority to safeguard principles of democratic coexistence among the three constituent ethnicities. It thereby perpetuates a feature of the post-Dayton system that is undemocratic by design.