Release peace: the magazine
Release peace: the magazine
Analysis & Background Stories on International Affairs
When China and India Battle for Influence in the Indian Ocean
Written by: Andrew Firmin with edits by Release Peace

Andrew Firmin is the CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. CIVICUS is the world’s biggest alliance of civil society organisations and activists, with over 12,000 members in 175 countries. Any opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of Release Peace. A version of this article was originally published in the CIVICUS Lens.
Andrew Firmin is the CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. CIVICUS is the world’s biggest alliance of civil society organisations and activists, with over 12,000 members in 175 countries. Any opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of Release Peace. A version of this article was originally published in the CIVICUS Lens.
The Geopolitics of an Indian Ocean Island Chain
In recent years, Maldives has become a major site of contestation in the battle for regional supremacy between China and India. The country is made up of a chain of small Indian Ocean islands with a population of just half a million. But its location is regarded as strategic, not least for control of major east-west shipping routes, vital for the transport of goods to and from Europe and the flow of crude oil from the Persian Gulf region to China.
The Recent Elections
In 2023, this geopolitical divided was represented by the choice on offer in the presidential elections. Mohamed Muizzu, now the president-elect, was the surprise winner of the first-round election, held on 9 September, when he took around 46 per cent of the vote compared to the roughly 39 per cent secured by Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, the incumbent seeking a second term. A runoff was held, which Muizzu won on around 54 per cent with Solih trailing at close to 46 per cent.
India, the nearer country, has historically had close ties with Maldives, something strongly supported by Solih, who emphasised India as the country’s key strategic partner. India’s mainland is located only 450km away from Maldives’ northernmost island, with India’s nearest island within 130km. But in contrast to Solih, Muizzu seems firmly in the China camp. Under the previous pro-China administration of which he was part from 2013 to 2018, Maldives was a recipient of Chinese support to develop infrastructure under its Belt and Road Initiative, epitomised by the 1.4 km China-Maldives Friendship Bridge that links the capital city Malé with two islands, one of which is home to the international airport.
India’s Military Presence
India has come to be a big issue in Maldivian political debate. Under Solih, India established a small military presence in Maldives, thought to be of around 75 people, mostly involved in providing air support for medical evacuations from isolated islands. But the development of a new harbour funded by India prompted accusations that the government was secretly planning to give India’s military a permanent base. This sparked opposition protests, under the banner of ‘India Out’, calling for the Indian military to be expelled. These peaceful protests faced multiple restrictions, with many protesters arrested. In 2022, Solih issued a decree deeming the protests a threat to national security and stating that they must stop.
Muizzu’s campaign sought to centre the debate on foreign interference and Maldives’ sovereignty. He used his victory rally to reiterate his campaign promise that foreign soldiers will be expelled, which means the Indian soldiers. In practice, the new administration is likely to mean a change of emphasis rather than an absolute switch. Maldives will continue to need to trade with both of the giant economies of China and India and likely look to play them off against each other. India will seek to maintain amicable relations in the hope that the political pendulum will eventually swing its way again.
Domestic Issues and a Worrying Trend
While the two candidates stood on opposite sides of a geopolitical divide, international relations were far from the only issue in the elections. Economic strife, the high cost of living, terrorist attacks, and combating corruption were high on the domestic list of voters’ concerns. Contrary to their diverging views on foreign policy, there seems some domestic common ground between Muizzu and Solih. Most notably, their views may be similar when it comes to hostility to civil society and other dissenting voices.
Past Context
The last national election in 2018 was preceded by the declaration of a state of emergency enabling a crackdown on the media, civil society and the judiciary. Judges and politicians were jailed. Protests were routinely banned and violently dispersed, as well as protest organisers criminalised. Constitutional rights including the right to privacy, the right not to be unlawfully arrested or detained and the right to appeal were suspended. Independent media websites were blocked and journalists subjected to physical attacks. This occurred under the government in which Muizzu served as a minister, headed by the leader of Muizzu’s party, Abdulla Yameen.
Watchdog organisation Transparency Maldives has repeatedly highlighted the government’s conduct in relation to the election. Despite the continuing reporting by Transparency Maldives and other outlets, journalists have expressed strong concerns around their ability to work freely and without fear of retribution for expressing critical opinions.
Civil Society
A prominent civil society organisation (CSO), the Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN), was forcefully deregistered in 2019 and had its funds seized following pressure from religious groups after it published a report on violent extremism. It now operates from exile in Germany. There was a campaign for a similar ban on the women’s rights organisation Uthema.
Shahindha Ismail, founder of MDN, describes the situation as follows: “One of the biggest obstacles the government has placed on civil society work is its systematic refusal to release public information, which violates the Right to Information Law. The government ignores invitations from CSOs that conduct assessments of governance quality, depriving them of the opportunity to discuss their findings and recommendations with government officials. Public expressions of concern and requests regarding the malfunction of government systems generally go unheard and ignored. The government is selective about the CSOs it engages with. More critical and vocal organisations receive no cooperation from the government.”
A restrictive protest law stayed in effect and parliament rejected changing it in 2020. Police violence towards protesters continued, as did impunity. Civil society groups were still smeared and vilified if they criticised the government or hardline conservative religious groups. Women’s rights activists have been particularly targeted. President-elect Muizzu has not indicated any intention to amend the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Act 2013 to guarantee the right to protest, including by limiting police powers to prevent assemblies.