The Rapid Recognition of a New President

As recently as December 2024, the current president of Syria had a $10 million bounty from the U.S. on his head. It was removed in that month and by January 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa formally dissolved its armed group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) and integrated all armed factions into Syria’s Ministry of Defence. Simultaneously, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) became Syria’s national caretaker government under al-Sharaa’s self-declared presidency. On June 30, 2025, the United States lifted most Syria sanctions, and soon after removed HTS from its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. Al-Sharaa now serves as Syria’s internationally recognised interim president. This transformation took 13 years and followed a systematic pattern. Understanding how al-Sharaa’s legitimisation occurred reveals not only often-overlooked insights into how language can legitimise terrorist groups, but also holds a warning for what is currently unfolding in the Sahel.

A Step Back in Time and a Systematic Pattern

In 2012, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani founded Jabhat al-Nusra as the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda. By January 2025 and he had become Syria’s president without ideological renunciation or democratic transition. This transformation unfolded across five phases:

First, al-Sharaa undertook an organisational rebranding. HTS formally broke away from al-Qaeda in 2016. This created a distance in name that allowed outside observers to refer to HTS as a Syrian movement rather than a global franchise. Later, governance institutions were built when HTS established the Syrian Salvation Government, developing courts, ministries, and public services. This all made it seem legitimate to aid organisations requiring bureaucratic partners. What followed next was international engagement: Humanitarian actors negotiated access through HTS structures, further normalising it as a governing authority. Through strategic messaging, al-Sharaa reframed himself in media appearances as a pragmatic Syrian nationalist, not an ideological extremist. More recently, the last step was formal recognition: After long-term dictator Assad’s fall, most Western and other governments lifted sanctions and removed HTS from terror lists, validating al-Sharaa’s presidency.

How Language Creates Political Reality

Importantly, across these stages legitimacy was constructed discursively, not through reform. When international organisations describe armed groups, their language shapes political outcomes. Between 2016 and 2025, al-Sharaa‘s ideology remained rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, and his governance methods stayed authoritarian. Organisational structures under HTS preserved leadership continuity from its predecessor organisation, Jabhat al-Nusra. What changed was how international institutions talked about him.

From Al-Qaeda to “Non-State Actor”

In 2014, the UN Security Council ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee listed the Al-Nusra Front as “associated with Al-Qaeda”, with HTS added as an alias in 2017. By 2020, UNICEF’s Whole of Syria Humanitarian Situation Report described northwestern Syria with neutral and vague terminology like “armed groups” controlling territory. By 2021, the International Crisis Group noted that HTS is distinct from ISIS and that it “has been at war with ISIS since 2014.” In 2022, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy described HTS as operating “more like a government than a non-state actor,” with al-Sharaa demonstrating relative pragmatism. By 2025, diplomatic recognition for al-Sharaa as Syria’s president required minimal justification.

Humanitarian Access and Language

This progression matters because institutional language does more than describe; it legitimises. When UN agencies and humanitarian organisations adopted operationally neutral terminology for access purposes, they created what a 2024 humanitarian access analysis explicitly documented: “They are the de facto authorities. Whether we like it or not, it doesn’t matter.” International actors constructed al-Sharaa’s political authority through their own reporting, with each shift in language performing incremental legitimation independent of his actual governance transformation.

What al-Sharaa‘s Trajectory Reveals

The path from al-Qaeda operative to internationally recognised president demonstrates that legitimacy in conflict zones is constructed not just materially but also discursively. Repeated official statements and institutional reports that carry authority accumulate into recognised political authority over time. Al-Sharaa‘s legitimisation was not inevitable in 2016. It resulted from thirteen years of legitimating language that treated governance improvements as transformation.

Tracing a Similar Pattern in the Sahel

Syria’s recent past is a part of the world’s history that is valuable to learn from. And perhaps it is in the process of repeating itself right now. In the Sagel, the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) now controls or contests much of northern and eastern Burkina Faso and Mali. It also maintains a shifting presence in northern Togo, and Niger, where its governance structures remain weakest. Similar to HTS, the group started out as an al-Qaeda affiliate. It was formed in March 2017 by a merger of four jihadist groups. JNIM’s organisational strategy distinguishes it from other regional armed groups. Security analysts from ACLED note that JNIM leaders explicitly cited HTS and their formation in Syria as their model. This was not rhetorical borrowing a conscious replication of HTS’s legitimisation strategy. HTS’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, received international recognition as a head of state, which distinguished his trajectory notably from other al-Qaeda affiliates.

JNIM is Currently at a Critical Stage

JNIM’s March 2017 formation created organisational distance from a direct al-Qaeda designation while maintaining ideological alignment. Security analyses characterise the group as “uniquely dominant in low-kinetic civilian engagement” among West African jihadist organisations. The governance infrastructure mirrors HTS’s 2017-2019 period. JNIM administers tax systems, operates dispute resolution mechanisms, and provides basic services in territories where state presence has collapsed. The group established administrative structures that regulate commerce, adjudicate conflicts according to Islamic law, and maintain public order. These governance functions create the operational realities that the local public and international organisations must navigate. They generate the same pragmatic engagement pressures for the latter that characterised HTS’s legitimating trajectory.

Downplaying Downsides and JNIM’s Replication

Meanwhile, ideological continuity and authoritarian rule were downplayed. Those same discourse patterns are currently building around JNIM in the Sahel. International actors describe JNIM governance using increasingly neutral terminology. Humanitarian organisations frame engagement through operational pragmatism rather than counterterrorism frameworks. Analysts characterise the group as strategically evolved compared to regional competitors. The language used today may structure what becomes politically possible tomorrow. Al-Sharaa’s trajectory shows that legitimacy solidifies when armed movements rebrand, govern, and sustain consistent messaging long enough for normalisation. JNIM has replicated the first two conditions and is actively developing the third. The construction process that took thirteen years for HTS is visible in the Sahel at an earlier stage.